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AbstrAct
This paper studies the integration of rice markets in the mid-west and far-west districts of Nepal. 
The data were drawn mainly from the World Food Programme (WFP) database on Nepal. Results 
indicate that the rice markets of the hinterland are poorly integrated with the regional market of 
Nepalgunj. In contrast, price fluctuations are transmitted, both in the short and medium run, across 
the Indian-Nepali border between Nepalgunj and the Indian border districts of Rupedia and Jogbani. 
Large price differentials relative to transport costs indicate market inefficiencies in the mid-west and 
far-west districts of Nepal. Moreover, the poor road infrastructure determines the price differentials. 
Poor infrastructure impedes price correlation and convergence between these districts. Given its open-
door policy with India and the ongoing efforts to further align trade policies with the World Trade 
Organization, the findings suggest that Nepal would maintain its partnership with India and build 
an effective market surveillance system that covers the Indian border markets as well, to ensure food 
security in the short run. However, substantial investment in transport infrastructure is required to 
improve market integration and accessibility in the long run, especially in the hilly and mountainous 
areas. 
INtrODUctION 
Over the past two decades, Nepal’s extensive 
trade liberalization on both fronts, domestic and 
external, has made its tariffs among the lowest 
in South Asia (Pyakuryal, Thapa and Roy 2005). 
Nepal has implemented several policy reforms, 
downsizing its public distribution system and 
removing a host of agricultural subsidies, in order to 
move its agrarian economy towards a more market-
oriented system (Box 1). Since the accession of 
Nepal to the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) 
membership in 2004, further trade reforms have 
been prepared in order to better align the trade 
regime with WTO recommendations. Hence, by 
2010, all duties and charges other than customs 
duties are expected to be phased out.
While  research  findings  suggest  that 
liberalization has resulted in drastic changes 
favorable to the commodity trade patterns between 
Nepal and India, its impact on agriculture has been 
mixed in terms of productivity and income growth 
(Sharma 1994; Chapagain 2000; Upadhaya 2000; 
ANZDEC 2002; Pyakuryal, Thapa and Roy 2005). 
The annual growth of the agriculture sector has 
remained below 3% over the past years (2002-
2006), resulting in the slow growth of per capita 
incomes in rural areas. Records show that per capita 
income has inched upward by only 1.4 percent per 
year, relying increasingly on remittances. On the 
average, agriculture productivity remains quite 
low by South Asian standards, with cereal yields 
estimated at about 2t/h. Despite a significant 
improvement of the living standards for Nepal 140 Asian Journal of Agriculture and Development, Vol. 4, No. 1
Box 1: Nepal-India trade agreements
Bilateral treaties on trade and an agreement for cooperation to control unauthorized trade govern trade 
relations between Nepal and India. Nepal signed its first Trade and Transit Treaty with India in 1950. The 
treaty was renewed in 1960, 1971, 1978 (when trade was de-linked from transit), 1991, 1996 and 2002. 
The key features of the treaty are:
-     Exemption from basic customs duties and quantitative restrictions on imports of primary products on a 
reciprocal basis;
-     Access for selected Nepalese manufacturing exports to the Indian market free of basic customs duties 
and quantitative restrictions;
-     Preferential entry on manufacturing goods imported from India to Nepal, without any quantitative 
restrictions.
The Nepal-India Trade Treaty renewed in 2002 introduced several new provisions, including a) more 
stringent rules of origin, b) trade restriction quotas, c) clear specification of safeguard clauses, and d) 
submission of information regarding the basis of calculating rules of origin to the Indian government by 
Nepal on an annual basis.
Source: Action Aid (2006), Nepal Import Surge, a Case Study of Rice
as a whole1, income distribution remains uneven, 
with the hill and mountain areas of the mid-west 
and the far west regions, lagging behind in terms of 
per capita income2. The food commodity trade has 
compensated partially for the sluggish performance 
of the agriculture production. According to 
Pyakuryal, Thapa and Roy (2005), agricultural trade 
increased from an average of 9.1% of agricultural 
gross domestic product (GDP) in the first part of 
the 1990s to 13% in the second part. Imports from 
India have played a major role in the trade patterns, 
as about 60% of the landless households depend on 
cheaper rice from India. The import of food grains 
from India has increased since the price of rice in 
India is 12% lower (mainly due to subsidies on 
fertilizers and electricity for irrigation). However, 
the authors conclude that rice import has been a 
source of distress for net producers and sellers of 
rice in the Terai. 
These results raise important questions about 
the matter of spatial market integration in the trade 
operating among districts as well as with India. As 
seen above, previous studies have documented the 
impact of trade liberalization but very little evidence 
is known about the spatial market integration of 
rice, the main staple food in Nepal. Rice makes 
an important contribution to the food security 
situation of households in Nepal, as it constitutes 
the most preferred food commodity, and is grown 
by 76% of Nepali households. An efficient rice 
supply over space should favor the sharing of risk 
across districts by smoothing idiosyncratic price 
variations. The spatial price behavior in regional 
rice markets is an important indicator of overall 
market performance. Markets that are not integrated 
may convey inaccurate price information distorting 
the marketing decisions of rice producers and 
traders, thereby contributing to inefficient product 
movements.
The spatial integration of the rice market is 
of major importance in Nepal, given the difficult 
terrain, the long distances between market sources 
of the Terai and the mid- and far western districts, 
and the implications of these factors for food 
security. The analysis of the rice market price 
integration aims to examine in greater detail 
whether and to what extent price transmission can 
be considered as efficient across different locations 
within this region and adjoining districts. Given the 
landlocked nature of Nepal, the major role played 
1  The Nepal Living Standard Survey (NLSS) 2003/2004 estimates that 31% of the population lives below the poverty line, an 
11% decline from 1995/1996, with an increase of the per capita consumption (in nominal terms) from 6,802 Nepali Rupee 
(NRs) in 1995/96 to NRs15,848 in 2003/04.
2  Ministry of Finance (2005), Economic Survey, Kathmandu, Nepal.141 Issa Sanogo
by the Indian border markets is taken into account 
in this analysis.
This paper is organized as follows. The next 
sections briefly review the literature on commodity 
market price integration, presenting the basic 
rationale behind the main analytical techniques, 
and present the data and their limitations. Next, 
the price integration techniques to test rice price 
integration (including co-integration) among the 
far and mid-western districts of Nepal is applied. 
Then, the  market integration analysis to test market 
efficiency, using transaction costs is presented. 
Finally, a summary of the findings and discussion 
on some implications for the food security situation 
in the region under consideration follows.
A brIEF LItErAtUrE OVErVIEW 
Spatial Market Integration Techniques
According to Barrett and Li (2002), market 
integration is most usefully defined as tradability 
or contestability between markets. This definition 
includes the market clearance (spatial equilibrium) 
process in which the demand, supply, and transaction 
costs in distinct markets jointly determine prices 
and trade flows, as well as the transmission of price 
shocks from one market to another, or both. Barret 
(2005) defines the notion of tradability as the fact 
that a good is traded between two economies or 
that market intermediaries are indifferent between 
exporting from one market to another and not doing 
so. Tradability signals the transfer of excess demand 
from one market to another, as captured in actual 
or potential physical flows. Positive trade flows are 
sufficient to demonstrate spatial market integration 
under the tradability standard, though prices may 
not be equilibrated across markets. Spatial market 
integration conceptualized as tradability is only 
consistent with market efficiency when prices 
equilibrate across markets while trade occurs.
Existing approaches to testing spatial market 
integration may be divided into two broad 
categories. The first category of techniques uses 
the law of one price to test for the perfect co-
movement of prices. These techniques assume 
that if markets are integrated, price changes in 
one market will be transmitted on a one-for-one 
basis to other markets either instantaneously (e.g., 
Ravallion’s tests for short-run integration) or over 
a number of lags (e.g., Ravallion’s test for long-run 
integration). In practice, techniques for testing price 
co-movements are based on Granger-causality and 
co-integration procedures. These techniques allow 
for price co-movement to be less than perfect and 
allow for prices to be simultaneously determined. 
The literature has pointed out some indicators such 
as the simple correlation coefficients between city 
pairs, the co-integration coefficients (which capture 
the existence of a long-run linear relation between 
prices), and the parameters representing the speed 
of adjustment of prices from different regional 
markets to their equilibrium. Simple bi-variate 
correlation coefficients are interpreted as a measure 
of how closely price movements of a commodity 
at different markets are linked. However, this 
method can neither measure the direction of price 
integration between two markets, nor can it account 
for trade reversals, which are common where 
infrastructure is poor (Barrett 1996).
In order to take into account the above-
mentioned critique, co-integration procedures 
were developed to allow for the identification of 
both the integration process (including the speed 
of adjustment of prices) and its direction between 
two markets (Granger-causality test). If in the long 
run they exhibit a constant linear relation, then price 
series are likely co-integrated (i.e., interdependent). 
In other words, co-integration indicates non-
segmentation between the two series. 
Furthermore, co-integration techniques 
emphasize the identification of the structural 
determinants of the spatial integration of markets, 
which are needed for the implementation of 
investment policies oriented to develop commodity 
markets. Following this concern, the first step in 
the analysis consists of identifying an indicator of 
market integration (e.g., price). The second step in 
the analysis is oriented to identify the factors that 
explain the degree of market integration. Goletti 
et al. (1995) maintain that the degree of market 
integration is a result of the trade action itself as 
well as the operational environment, which is 
determined by the availability of transportation 
and telecommunication infrastructure and by 
the policies that affect the price transmission 
mechanism. Using a regression that links a market 
integration indicator with infrastructure variables, 
these authors find that for the rice market in 
Bangladesh, the main factors that determine the 142 Asian Journal of Agriculture and Development, Vol. 4, No. 1
market integration are the transportation (mainly 
paved roads) and telecommunication infrastructure, 
distance between localities, price variability, the 
existence of wholesaler commercialization centers 
in the localities under study, and the presence of 
geographical differences between regions. Similar 
findings were achieved by D’Angelo and Cordano 
in Peru (2005). 
Taking into consideration the possible sources 
of discontinuity and asymmetry in the responses of 
commodity market prices, the second category of 
techniques analyzes the spatial price integration of 
markets by introducing dynamic transaction costs 
as elements that affect arbitrage relations between 
different regions. The different techniques study 
arbitrage relations between two regions by using, 
mainly, the price series of a particular product. 
The analysis framework is based on the law of one 
price adjusted by transaction costs and assumes 
that the efficient spatial arbitrage requires that no 
extraordinary profits could be generated by trading 
between two markets. In other words, it is necessary 
that the law of one price, adjusted by transaction 
costs, is fulfilled. 
This approach suggests that transaction costs 
determine the parity bounds (price efficiency 
band) within which the prices of a homogeneous 
commodity in two geographically distinct markets 
can vary independently (Baulch 1997; Barrett 
and Li 2002). According to Baulch (1997), when 
transaction costs equal the inter-market price 
differential and there are no impediments to trade 
between markets, trade will cause prices in the 
two markets to move on a one-for-one basis and 
the spatial arbitrage conditions are binding. When 
transaction costs exceed the inter-market price 
differential, trade will not occur and the spatial 
arbitrage conditions will not be binding. When the 
inter-market price differential exceeds transaction 
costs, the spatial arbitrage conditions are violated 
whether or not trade occurs. In that case, there 
may be impediments to trade that weaken market 
integration. 
Some Limitations 
of Spatial Market Integration Techniques
Co-integration techniques are considered 
unreliable if transaction costs are non-stationary 
(Barrett 2001; Barrett and Li 2002; Fackler and 
Goodwin 2002). Failure to find co-integration 
between two price series may be consistent with 
market integration (Barrett 1996). In other words, 
rejection of the co-integration hypothesis may not 
necessarily mean lack of market integration; it can 
just be a reflection of transfer costs being non-
stationary. A review of the conclusions of several 
co-integration-based studies seems to go largely 
against this contention (Rashid 2004). Instead of 
finding lack of integration, most of the studies have 
concluded in favor of market integration. A second 
criticism against the co-integration method is that 
it cannot distinguish various arbitrage conditions, 
such as autarky, efficient arbitrage, and arbitrage 
failure.
A major limitation of the parity bound analysis 
is the lack of series on transaction costs. In 
general, these series are generated by extrapolation 
techniques that may not reflect the speed of the 
price adjustment when there exist profitable trade 
opportunities. Furthermore, this framework does 
not account for trade reversals. According to Barrett 
(2005), it also relies on arbitrary distributional 
assumptions in estimation and typically ignores the 
time-series properties of the data, not permitting 
analysis of the dynamics of inter-temporal 
adjustment to short-run deviations from long-run 
equilibrium, and potentially important distinctions 
between short-run and long-run integration, as 
attempted by price equilibrium approaches.
Despite recent statistical sophistication 
mentioned in the previous section, there is no single 
best approach that addresses all the shortcomings 
of the spatial market integration techniques. There 
are several factors that affect the degree of market 
integration and generate discontinuities in the price 
responses to exogenous shocks (Baulch 1997; 
D’Angelo and Cordano2005). 
The first one is the presence of high transaction 
costs relative to the price differential between two 
regions, which determines the existence of autarkic 
markets. The second factor is the presence of barriers 
to entry, risk aversion, and information failures. 
Some characteristics of the agricultural production, 
commercialization, and consumption, such as 
an inappropriate transportation infrastructure, 
entry barriers, and information failures, may turn 
the arbitrage process into a less smooth process 
than assumed by traditional models of market 
integration. 143 Issa Sanogo
A commonly-mentioned source of asymmetry 
in the price response to shocks is the market power. 
For example, the oligopolistic intermediaries in a 
commodity market may react collusively faster to 
shocks that reduce their profit margins, generating 
asymmetries in the transmission of those shocks 
to other segments of the market. As a result, an 
increase in the central market prices would be 
spread to the regional markets in a faster way than 
would a decrease in such prices. The existence 
of imperfect competition in relevant segments 
of the markets may cause high price differentials 
between markets that cannot be attributed to 
transaction costs. For example, the presence of 
search costs on imperfect regional commodity 
markets is considered as a source of asymmetry or 
discontinuities in the prices adjustment process that 
occurs as a response to exogenous shocks (Blinder 
et al. 1998). In many regions, some firms can 
exercise local market power, due to the absence of 
other firms located in spatial proximity that could 
compete with them. The consumers that face these 
dominant firms face high search costs to get all the 
information about prices offered by other firms. 
Under these conditions, dominant firms may raise 
their prices quickly when the dominant market’s 
prices increase, whereas they could reduce them 
by little, or not at all, when prices in the central 
market decrease.
Inventory  accumulation  has  also  been 
documented as a source of discontinuities in the 
adjustment of prices between markets. According 
to this argument, variations in prices send signals to 
inventory holders, thus leading them to accumulate 
or reduce stocks. The expected increase in the 
dominant market’s price in the next periods 
constitutes an incentive for traders to increase 
inventory holdings, therefore inducing them to 
buy big quantities of a certain agricultural product 
in the present. But the increase in local market 
stocks pushes prices down, so the actual increase is 
not as high as originally expected. If, on the other 
hand, the dominant market prices were expected to 
decrease, there would be an incentive for traders 
to reduce their inventory stocks—a response that 
would moderate the magnitude of the price fall in 
the next periods. Under the argument of inventory 
holdings, regional market prices would not fully 
adjust to changes in the dominant market prices.
Another argument that explains the presence 
of discontinuous or asymmetric price responses is 
the existence of menu costs, understood as those 
costs that result from the re-pricing and information 
process that producers face in the presence of 
exogenous variations. If variations in the costs 
of the commodity were perceived by the agents 
as temporary, the menu costs might constitute an 
incentive not to adjust prices even when a change 
in the product costs has actually occurred.
DAtA sOUrcEs AND LIMItAtIONs
The rice prices used in this paper are drawn 
from the Food Security Monitoring and Analysis 
System of the WFP country office in Nepal. The 
data cover 17 districts in the mid- and far- western 
region of Nepal, from January 2003 to December 
20053. Additional monthly price data were collected 
for Banke (Nepal) and the Indian border districts 
of Rupedia and Jogbani from January 2001 to 
December 2004. These data were compiled from 
various issues of the Statistical Information on 
Nepalese Agriculture of the Ministry of Agriculture. 
The price data were divided by the consumer price 
index to correct for inflation and avoid spurious 
results.
When comparing prices across the borders, 
it is necessary to account for changes in the 
exchange rates and to make the price comparisons 
denominated in the same currency. Nepali/Indian 
Rupee exchange rates data were collected from 
January 2001 to December 2004 to meet this 
requirement.
In the absence of a series on transport costs, 
the single time transport cost of 2005, collected 
from WFP, was extrapolated from January 2003 
to December 2005, by deflating by the monthly 
consumer price indices. As suggested by Baulch 
(1997), the extrapolation of transfer costs at a single 
point in time can be envisaged if the information on 
the different component of transfer costs is accurate. 
Aside from agricultural productivity (including 
quality aspects)4, the main costs explaining the 
difference between source markets (i.e., export 
3  The concerned districts are Banke, Achham, Baitadi, 
Bajhang, Bajura, Dadeldhura, Darchula, Doti, Dailekh, 
Dolpa, Jajarkot, Jumla, Mugu, Rukum, Salyan, Surkhet 
and Pyuthan.144 Asian Journal of Agriculture and Development, Vol. 4, No. 1
markets or surplus-production areas) and destination 
markets (i.e., import markets, deficit-production 
areas, or consumption markets), are transport costs, 
unloading costs, processing costs, interests to be 
paid on loans, margins, and losses5. WFP transport 
costs are based on tenders submitted by transporters 
on a competitive basis. They include overland and 
internal transport costs, storage costs, and handling 
(including loading and unloading) costs. They can 
therefore be considered as a good proxy indicator 
of transfer costs. Data on distance were collected 
for 14 districts in the mid- and far- western region 
to match with available road transport costs. Data 
on road distances were computed by WFP based 
on data from the Department of Roads.
It is worth noting that price, exchange rates, 
and transport costs variables are used in logarithm 
form throughout this paper. The log-transformation 
displays the advantage of making the series scale 
invariant and easing the interpretation of the 
changes as growth rates. 
The small sample size (mainly the time 
dimension) is, however, a major limitation of the 
data set. While it is of interest to compare price 
movements at short horizons for a relatively 
high frequency of data, e.g., monthly (Haldrup 
2003), such type of long-series data is hardly 
availabl. According to Haldrup, increasing the 
frequency of observations can only partially 
compensate for a short span of data. The reason 
is that new problems such as seasonality arise 
when the frequency of observations increases. 
However, the issue of seasonality cannot be fully 
addressed by choosing voluntarily a small series 
of observations. Seasonality was partially dealt 
with by introducing seasonal dummy variables 
in auxiliary regressions to control for the harvest 
season and road availability. The use of seasonal 
dummies will also reduce the number of lagged 
variables needed in the regressions. They, therefore 
contribute to improving the degree of freedom of 
the regressions. In the absence of seasonal dummy 
variables, the small sample size (i.e., below 30 
observations) requires using appropriate critical 
values for hypothesis testing. The econometric 
results should be interpreted with caution, despite 
these attempts to reduce data limitations.   
The price integration analysis within Nepal is 
based on the trade directions summarized in the 
map below.
 
tEstINg rIcE PrIcE INtEgrAtION 
Annex 1 indicates limited correlations between 
the far- and mid-west market prices in Nepal, 
suggesting price dispersion is likely to allow 
high profit opportunities. Most of the pair-wise 
correlation coefficients are below 50 percent, some 
being negative. Negative correlations suggest prices 
between two markets move in opposite directions. 
As shown in the rest of this section, this is likely to 
be due to the hilly and mountainous terrain which 
tends to isolate markets from each other.  
Using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root 
test, 12 price series (out of 19) are non-stationary 
(Annex 2). Although there is no reason to believe 
that the stationary series (I(0)) are structurally 
different from the non-stationary (I(1)) ones, the 
co-integration test will exclude the stationary series. 
According to Granger (1981), it is not advisable to 
run a co-integration test of a I(0) variable on a I(1) 
variable or vice versa because the relationship is 
not  balanced. 
The results indicate very limited price co-
integration between districts in the far- and mid-
west of Nepal, suggesting the far-west and mid-west 
markets do not operate as a unified rice market 
(Annex 3). On the other hand, the regional market 
of Banke and the Indian border districts are likely 
inter-dependent. Out of 136 regressions, only 45 
are balanced with non-stationary price series on 
both sides of the regression equation. Of these 45 
regressions, 12 are co-integrated, that is only 9% of 
the 136 pair-wise co-integration regressions. In other 
words, prices in any given district can drift apart 
from prices in most other districts in the far-west 
4  Quality differentials are not considered as a significant issue since grains are generally considered as homogeneous 
commodities.
5  Transfer costs also include other costs such as information costs and policy-induced costs since such costs involve the 
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and mid-west areas of Nepal. The limited number 
of co-integrated prices occurs mainly between 
the transit market price of Sanfebagar in Achham 
and its surrounding districts. The co-integration 
regression suggests there is no price co-integration 
between the regional market of Nepalgunj (Banke) 
and the transit markets of Surkhet and Achham. 
In the meantime, the rice price in Banke is likely 
co-integrated with the prices in the Indian border 
districts of Rupedia and Jogbani, as suggested by 
the price patterns (Figure 1). The co-integrating 
parameters and the adjustment parameters are 
statistically significant for both Rupedia and 
Jogbani, suggesting that the rice price in Banke is 
more likely to adjust significantly to price changes 
in the Indian border market prices of Rupedia and 
Jogbani (Annex 3).
In order to assess whether price movements 
follow well-defined patterns, from production/
supply centers to consumption/demand centers, a 
Granger causality test between each pair of price 
series is applied using the Ravallion model (see 
Box 2). Alternatively, an error correction model is 
estimated on each co-integrated pair of price series 
(Pi and Pj) (Table 1). The first difference of Pi is 
Granger-caused by the first difference of Pj in the 
error correction model if the coefficient of the latter 
is statistically significant. 
The estimations suggest a lack of clear pattern 
of the impact of price shocks as there are very 
few price series that Granger-cause each other. 
Granger-causality is statistically significant for only 
4 regressions out of 28. 
The results suggest that markets close by are 
more likely to Granger-cause each other. The rice 
price in Bajhang is Granger-caused by the price 
series in the neighboring districts of Bajura and 
Darchula. The price series in Banke (Nepalgunj) is 
Granger-caused by the price series in Rupedia, the 
adjoining Indian border district. In the meantime, 
the price series in Banke Granger-cause price series 
in Jogbani (India). These results suggest  two-way 
trade flows between Banke, Rupedia and Jogbani. 
Actually, Banke (Nepalgunj) is one of the four 
major customs points (i.e., along with Biratnagar, 
Birgunj, and Bhairahawa) where most of the formal 
importation of rice and paddy into Nepal takes 
place. Over 90 percent of all rice imports through 
Fig. 1. Monthly price patterns of rice between Nepali/Indian border districts (Jan. 2001-Dec. 2004).147 Issa Sanogo
 Box 2: Formulation of the spatial market integration model.
As summarized by Sadoulet and de Janvry (1997), the basic model of Ravallion (1986) consists in taking 
into account the structure of price determination across markets. This model considers a radial distribution 
of markets where one central market (r) is related to n feeder markets not directly related to each other. 
(1)  Pr = Pr (P1,…,Pn, Xr) central market price,
(2)  Pi = Pi (Pr, Xi), i = 1,…,n  feeder market prices,
where the X are market-specific seasonal and exogenous variables which affect price formation. For 
estimation purposes, the dynamic structure of the feeder market price equations is specified as a function 
of past prices with a general structure of l lags as follows: 
(3) Pit = ∑αijPi,t-j + ∑βijPr,t-j + γiXit + eit, i= 1,…,n. In first sum, j = 1,…,l. In the second sum, j = 0,…,l
Estimation of this equation, typically with monthly price quotations, can be used to test the following 
hypotheses about market integration:
Segmentation of market i: present and past central market prices do not influence the ith local market. 
[note: pls correct typo errors in the preceding line)
In this case: βij = 0, j = 1,…,l.
Short-term market integration: a price increase in the central market is fully and immediately passed on 
the ith market without lagged effects. In this case, βi0 = 1, βij = αij = 0, j = 1,…,l.
Long-run market integration: under long-run equilibrium, a permanent price change in the central market 
is fully passed over time to the feeder markets, but potentially through lagged effects. The test of long-run 
market integration consists of testing: ∑αij + ∑βij = 1.
If the market structure is not one of radial central-feeder markets, but more generally of pair-wise 
interlinked markets, the test of integration is done by evaluating all pair -ise price relationships (i,j) in the 
spatial relations. Assuming there is only one lag, the feeder market price equations simplify to:
[Note to Berns: Pls make sure the entire contents of the box is printed; bottom part is missing]
(4) Pit = αiPi,t-1 + βi0Prt + βi1Pr,t-1 + γiXit + eit, 
which can be written in first differences as:
(5) ΔPit = (αi-1)(Pi,t-1 - Pr,t-1)  + βi0ΔPrt + (αi + βi0 + βi1 -1)Pr,t-1 + γiXit + eit.
This relates the change in local price to past spatial price differentials, the current change in central 
market price, and market-specific exogenous variables. Since there is less multicollinearity in this first 
difference equation (5) than in the price equation (4), it is this equation that is estimated. The tests of 
market integration are then:
Market segmentation: βi0 = βi1 = 0.
Short-run market integration: βi0 = 1, βi1 = αi = 0.
Long-run market integration: αi + βi0 + βi1 – 1 = 0.
There is a simultaneity problem in the estimation of the ΔPit equation (5) since ΔPrt is by definition 
endogenous as it is related to price formation in the local markets. Ravallion thus uses an instrumental 
variable approach to predict ΔPrt in a two-stage least squares (TSLS) estimation.
Source: Sadoulet E. and A. de Janvry (1997): Quantitative Development Policy Analysis, The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, Baltimore and London, 127-129.148 Asian Journal of Agriculture and Development, Vol. 4, No. 1
formal channels take place through these customs 
points6. 
Unfortunately, there is no time series on trade 
flows and even when they are, such data are usually 
reported on an annual basis from official sources, 
hence making it difficult to compare with monthly 
price data. Caution is therefore required in the 
interpretation of the Granger-causality results. 
Another limitation of these results is due to the fact 
that regressions are carried out on small samples, 
making results sensitive to the number of distributed 
lags that are used. 
An attempt to capture the impact of isolation 
on both the price correlation and the co-integration 
suggests that poor road infrastructure may lead to 
high transaction costs, thereby making arbitrage 
unprofitable and isolating markets (Fafchamps and 
Gavian 1996). Both the price correlation and the co-
integration coefficients (dependent variables) are 
regressed on road distance and a dummy variable 
which takes the value 1 when there is a motorable 
road and 0 otherwise. Road distances explain 
only 5% of the variance of the price correlation 
coefficient, suggesting additional determinants 
of the price correlation could be added to the 
regression. After controlling for heteroskedasticity, 
distance has a negative impact, though statistically 
insignificant, on the price correlation coefficient 
Table 1. Error correction models: results of pair-wise price regressions.
Source: Author’s estimates.
6  Unrecorded or informal trade is an important feature of Nepal's trade with India (Action Aid 2006). The open and porous border 
has paved the way for a huge amount of informal trading across the border. The extent of informal trading in agricultural 
produce is estimated to be much higher than that of formal trade. Informal trade towards Nepal from India is dominated by 
agricultural products, mainly food items.149 Issa Sanogo
Table 1. Error correction models: results of pair-wise price regressions. (Annex 4). Using the co-integration coefficients 
as dependent variables, the regression indicates 
that road distances and the dummy variable of 
motorable road availability explain about 52% of 
the co-integration statistic. After controlling for 
heteroskedasticity, the square distance has a negative 
but statistically insignificant impact, suggesting that 
beyond a threshold (maximum), distant markets 
are less likely to be co-integrated. The regression 
indicates also a positive and statistically significant 
impact of motorable road availability on the co-
integration statistic, suggesting markets that are 
linked by motorable roads are more likely to be 
co-integrated (i.e., inter-dependent). 
Tests  of  short-  and  medium-run  price 
transmission processes indicate the Banke regional 
market (Nepalgunj) is likely integrated both in 
the short-and medium-run, with the Indian border 
markets of Rupedia and Jogbani (Table 2). Using 
the Ravallion model, a pair of equations is jointly 
estimated, using Three Stage Least Squares (TSLS), 
with one or two lags. Ravallion’s model suggests 
adding control variables that can have a possible 
effect on price fluctuations. The exchange rate of 
the Nepali Rupee against the Indian Rupee is a 
major determinant of trade flows across the border 
because the former is pegged to the latter. A dummy 
variable representing the period of rice harvest in 
Nepal is also added to capture the possible effect 
of the harvest on rice price fluctuations. The first 
test (i.e., the null hypothesis that markets are 
segmented) suggests price integration between 
Banke, Rupedia, and Jogbani. The second test 
(i.e., the null hypothesis that markets are jointly 
integrated in the short run) suggests short-run 
integration between Banke and Jogbani. The third 
test (i.e., the null hypothesis that markets are jointly 
integrated in the medium run) suggests medium-run 
integration, i.e. price movements tend to converge 
after a couple of month between Banke, Rupedia 
and Jogbani. 
Overall, the results of the various estimations 
and tests conducted so far should be interpreted 
with caution as they reflect only co-movements in 
prices, not market efficiency which is part of the 
market integration analysis. The patterns of price 
co-movements are considered as a good indicator of 
market efficiency only if goods always flow in the 
same direction (Baulch 1997). With transportation 
and other transaction costs, flow reversals cause 
prices to switch between import (trade destination) 
and export (trade source) parity prices (Fafchamps 
Table 2. Short- and medium-run price integration: Ravallion Model Estimations and Tests.
Note: DPj,t = First difference (D) of prices (P) in district j in period t; Pi,t = Prices (P) in district i in period t; lnforex = Log-
Foreign exchange Nepali/Indian Rupee; harv = dummy for rice harvest= 1 or 0 otherwise.150 Asian Journal of Agriculture and Development, Vol. 4, No. 1
and Gavian 1996). In the presence of transactions 
costs, standard tests of market integration may 
conclude erroneously that markets are unrelated.
AN AttEMPt tO cAPtUrE 
MArKEt EFFIcIENcY
If markets are efficient and spatially integrated, 
price differentials across districts should reflect 
trade patterns: prices should increase as one 
moves away from supply/production centers due 
to increased distance and transport costs. To check 
whether this occurs, and assuming the regional 
market of Banke (Nepalgunj) is the source market, 
we compute the average price differentials and 
transport costs between Banke and the far- and 
mid-western districts, using sample averages. 
The results summarized in Table 3 suggest 
there is a positive relationship between price 
differentials, road distances, and transport costs, 
though the correlation is low. There is a relatively 
high correlation (47%) between transport costs and 
motorable road distance. However, only one-third 
of the variance of the price is explained by transport 
costs, and the role of distance is even lower, 
accounting for only 10 percent of the variance of 
the price. Some high-price districts such as Jajarkot 
and Rukum are near the regional market of Banke 
and the transit market of Surkhet, as opposed to the 
low price district of Baitadi in the far-west. High 
price districts (Jajarkot and Rukum) are also right 
next to low-price districts (Salyan and Pyuthan), 
suggesting distance and road transport costs are not 
enough to explain price differentials in the far- and 
mid-west of Nepal. 
The sample averages used in this section can 
only be considered as a proxy indicator to measure 
market efficiency, as they ignore seasonal and 
geographical patterns (such as the cropping patterns, 
weather conditions, the terrain, geographical 
location, and the long- standing conflict) which 
affect price differentials across districts.
To investigate further the issue of market 
efficiency, we examine the evolution of price 
differentials relative to transportation costs. 
According to Baulch (1997), two markets may 
be said to be spatially integrated if, when trade 
takes place between them, price in the importing 
market equals price in the exporting market plus 
the transportation and other transfer costs involved 
in moving food between them. Whenever the price 
differential between the two markets falls below 
the transfer costs, there is no incentive to trade 
and spatial arbitrage conditions can no more be 
considered as a key to traders’ decision- making. 
When, on the other hand, the price differential 
exceeds transfer costs, there are likely impediments 
to trade, though trade may occur. In such a context, 
markets cannot be considered as integrated.
The results summarized in Table 4 provide 
additional indication that market inefficiencies are 
likely an issue in the mid- and far- west districts 
Source: Author’s estimates.
Table 3. Comparison of price differentials with transport costs (averages).151 Issa Sanogo
of Nepal. In most of the cases, the monthly 
price differentials are higher than the transport 
costs between Banke and the inland districts, 
suggesting trade is likely occurring between 
markets despite impediments and lack of market 
integration. In addition to the negative impact of 
poor road infrastructure (shown in Section 4), 
trade impediments are likely due to the negative 
impact of the long-standing conflict on food 
trade in the mid- and far-western districts. A 
study conducted jointly by WFP and the Food 
and Agriculture Organization (FAO) concluded 
that market functioning has weakened in conflict-
affected areas due to market shutdowns; the induced 
shortage of goods and services; the physical 
damage of goods and foodstuff incurred during 
transport on unsafe roadways; the obstruction 
of production, processing, transportation and 
trading of agricultural commodities; the  damage 
to physical infrastructure; and the price instability 
due to taxation, donation and transport strikes, 
blockades and bandhs (WFP/FAO 2007). 
Finally, the attempt to capture market efficiency 
remains limited by the lack of trade survey to 
support the empirical evidence. The high frequency 
of months in which price differentials are lower 
than the transport costs in the cluster districts of 
Dadeldhura and Baitadi suggests that trade flows 
are likely limited between these districts and Banke, 
as they depend primarily on the regional market of 
Attaria/Dhangadhi, a major rice-growing area in the 
far-western region of Nepal. The interpretation of 
the relatively balanced number of months in which 
price differentials are higher or lower than transport 
costs— between the adjoining districts of Banke, 
Salyan and Pyuthan— would also require further 
research on potential trade reversals. Although the 
hypothesis of trade reversals can be put forward 
because these districts are located in the major 
agricultural area surrounding the district of Dang 
in the mid-west, any consistent conclusion can be 
drawn in the absence of a trader survey. The lack 
of such vital information constitutes therefore a 
limitation to this paper.
cONcLUDINg rEMArKs 
AND POLIcY IMPLIcAtIONs
This paper has assessed the performance of the 
rice market in mid-west and far-west Nepal. The 
objective was to analyze how price transmission, 
across different locations, operates within this 
Table 4. Patterns of price differentials compared with transport costs (frequencies).
Note: Pls replace “Sum Cases” above with “Total No. of Cases”
Source: Author’s Estimates.152 Asian Journal of Agriculture and Development, Vol. 4, No. 1
region and the role played by the adjoining district 
markets of India in the rice supply. By examining 
the nature of relationships among different markets, 
the paper also aimed to improve the understanding 
of the rice market operation in a highly vulnerable 
region characterized by a difficult terrain, frequent 
droughts, and a long-lasting conflict. Such 
information could contribute to decision-making 
relative to the formulation of effective rice 
marketing policies. 
Various  empirical  techniques,  using 
econometric tests of price transmission across 
markets, were reviewed and used to assess the 
efficiency of the spatial integration of rice markets. 
To our knowledge, this is the first time that such an 
empirical analysis has been attempted for Nepal. 
The results indicate that the rice markets in mid-
west and far west Nepal exhibit a limited degree 
of spatial integration with the regional market 
of Nepalgunj. In other words, price fluctuations 
are unlikely to spread from the source market of 
Nepalgunj (Banke) to distant markets of the far- 
and mid-western districts. The results also show 
that price fluctuations are transmitted across the 
Indian-Nepali border between Banke and the Indian 
border districts of Rupedia and Jogbani, with some 
degree of short- and medium- run convergence. An 
attempt to capture the impact of isolation (through 
road distance and availability) on both the price 
correlation and the price convergence, suggests that 
poor road infrastructure is likely an underlying cause 
of high transaction costs, thereby making arbitrage 
unprofitable for traders and isolating markets. As 
backed by theory, there is a positive relationship 
between price differentials, road distances and 
transport costs, though it appears to be a weak 
correlation. This finding suggests the existence of 
market inefficiencies in the mid- and far-western 
districts  of Nepal. However, these results should 
be interpreted cautiously as the time frame used 
in this paper was very short and similar follow-up 
studies are needed as the price data base builds 
up in WFP’s food security monitoring system in 
Nepal. Detailed structure, conduct and performance 
market surveys could throw new light on market 
efficiency, especially on key factors determining 
traders’ decision to move rice across districts. Such 
a study would be particularly relevant in the context 
of the ongoing peace building efforts.
Despite these limitations, there is one important 
policy implication arising from the results, namely:   
any market intervention in isolated districts would 
have limited effects across the markets because 
of the lack of market integration. As a short-term 
measure, this result could justify government and 
humanitarian interventions in the far- and mid-west 
isolated districts to ensure that rice is available 
to households at a reasonable cost. However, the 
sustainability of such interventions in the long run 
is in question because of the high budget costs. 
Given the limited capacity of the government to 
supply food commodities to isolated markets at 
a subsidized cost, food aid plays a key role in the 
far- and mid-west districts both by providing food 
to households and building feeder roads. 
In the long run, substantial investment in road 
infrastructure is required to improve the integration 
of markets. Market integration will play a crucial 
role in improving the food security situation of 
the mid- and far-western regions of Nepal which 
account for the highest number of cereal-deficit 
districts of the country. Price increases due to 
supply shortfalls in this region could be reduced by 
market integration which would therefore mitigate 
the negative effects on households’ food access. 
Better road infrastructure, among other factors, 
could have positive effects on the food security 
situation of the mid- and far-western districts by 
improving the transport of food commodities from 
the regional market of Nepalgunj to food-deficit 
areas, at lower costs of access to markets, and with 
less delay. 
rEFErENcEs
Action Aid. 2006. Import Surge in Nepal, a Case Study of 
Rice. Katmandu.(April).
ANZDEC. 2002. Nepal Agriculture Sector Performance 
Review. ADB TA No. 3536-NEP. Draft Final Report, 
Vol. 1: Main Text. ANZDEC Limited, New Zealand.
Barrett, C.B. 2005. “Spatial Market Integration”.  The New 
Palgrave Dictionnary of Economics, 2nd Edition. 
London: Palgrave Macmillan. Forthcoming. 
_______. 1996. “Market Analysis Methods: Are our 
Enriched Toolkits Well Suited to Enlivened Markets?” 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics,78: 
825–829.
_______. 2001. “Measuring Integration and Efficiency 
in International Agricultural Markets”. Review of 
Agricultural Economics, 23: 19–32.153 Issa Sanogo
Barrett, C.B. and J. Li. 2002. “Distinguishing between 
Equilibrium and Integration in Spatial Price Analysis”. 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics,.84: 
292–307.
Baulch, B. 1997. “Transfer Costs, Spatial Arbitrage, and 
Testing for Food Market Integration”. American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics,79 (May): 477-
487.
Pyakural B., Y.B. Thapa, and D. Roy. 2005. “Trade 
Liberalisation and Food Security in Nepal”. Discussion 
paper No.88 (October). IFPRI, Market Trade and 
Institution Division.
Blinder, A.S., E. Canetti, D. Lebow, and J. Rudo. 
1998. Asking About Prices: A New Approach to 
Understanding Price Stickiness. New York: Russell 
Sage Foundation.
Chapagain, D. 2000. “An Overview of Liberalization and 
its Effects on Agriculture and Poverty in Nepal”.  Do 
We Need Economic Reforms Phase II? Institute for 
Integrated Development Studies, Kathmandu.
Chowdhury S., A. Negassa, and M. Torero. 2005. “Market 
Institutions: Enhancing the Value of Rural-Urban 
Links”. Discussion paper No.89 (October). IFPRI, 
Market Trade and Institution Division.
D’Angelo, J.E. and A. V. Cordano. 2005. “Market 
Integration for Agricultural Output Markets in Peru: 
The Role of Public Infrastructure”.  http://129.3.20.41/
eps/ urb/papers/0507/0507003.pdf (accessed July 1, 
2007).
Fackler, P. and B. Goodwin. 2002. “Spatial Price Analysis”. 
In B. Gardner and G. Rausser, eds., Handbook 
of Agricultural Economics, vol. 1B. Amsterdam: 
Elsevier.
Fafchamps, M. and S. Gavian. 1996. “The Spatial 
Integration of Livestock Markets in Niger”. Journal 
of African Economies, 5: 366-405.
Goletti, F., R. Ahmed, and N. Farid. 1995. “Structural 
Determinants of Market Integration: The Case of Rice 
Markets in Bangladesh”. Developing Economies, 33: 
185-202.
Haldrup, N. 2003. “Empirical Analysis of Price Data in the 
Delineation of the Relevant Geographical Market in 
Competition Analysis”. Working Paper No.2003-09. 
Department of Economics, University of Aarhus, 
Denmark.
Ministry of Finance. 2005.  Economic Survey. Kathmandu, 
Nepal.
Rashid, S. 2004. “Spatial Integration of Maize Markets 
in post-Liberalized Uganda.”. Discussion Paper 
No.71 (May). IFPRI, Market Trade and Institution 
Division.
Ravallion, M. 1986. “Testing Market Integration”. American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics,  68: 1 (February): 
102-109.
Sadoulet, E. and A. de Janvry. 1997. Quantitative 
Development Policy Analysis. Baltimore:  Johns 
Hopkins University Press, and London.
Sharma, S. 1994. “Economic Liberalization and Agricultural 
Development in Nepal Policy Analysis in Agriculture 
and Related Resource Management”. Research Report 
Series No.26. Winrock International, HMG, MOA, 
Kathmandu.
Upadhya, S. 2000. Farmers in Flux: A Participatory 
Study of Fertilizer Use in the Context of Economic 
Liberalization. Action Aid, Kathmandu.
WFP/FAO. 2007. Food and Agricultural Markets in Nepal. 
Final Report, February. Katmandu.
 154 Asian Journal of Agriculture and Development, Vol. 4, No. 1
Annex 2. Price integration tests (augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests).
Annex 1.  Price correlation coefficients.155 Issa Sanogo
Annex 3. Pair wise (Johansen) cointegration tests.156 Asian Journal of Agriculture and Development, Vol. 4, No. 1
Annex 4. Estimation of correlation and cointegration coefficients on road distances.